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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Amber Round appeals from the district court's Order Suspending Sentence and
Order of Probation. In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Round asserted that the district court
erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of her right to be
free from unreasonable seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

This Reply Brief is

necessary to address some factual and legal assertions raised by the State in its
Respondent's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Round's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this in Reply Brief in
their entirety, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Round's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Round's Motion To Suppress

Ms. Round asserts that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress
as that the length of her initially lawful detention was impermissibly extended solely to
allow a drug dog to sniff the exterior of her vehicle, based upon Detective Christensen
"hunch" that there were drugs in the vehicle. Her arguments in support of this assertion
are contained in her Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated herein in detail.
In response, the State, while initially stating that "[t]he parties do not dispute the
central facts of this case" and quoting the district court's findings of fact, makes factual
assertions that are inconsistent with those findings of fact. (Respondent's Brief, pp.1-2.)
First, the State asserts that Ms. Round "fled" when she noticed the police and that her
"flight from the scene" was part of the reasonable suspicion "allowing them to further
investigate her."

(Respondent's Brief, p.7 (citing Tr. 2/22/10, p.28, L.19 - p.29, L.1

(testimony of Detective Holtry stating that the Ms. Round's vehicle "had taken off
through the alley" but making no claim that she had seen the officers).)

The State

apparently uses the terms "fled" and "flight" to suggest that Ms. Round had a guilty
conscience.

However, as Detective Christensen acknowledged, he was in an

unmarked vehicle and, when he saw that Ms. Round's vehicle "started down the
alleyway," he followed her for about 50 yards then initiated a traffic stop, and Ms. Round
stopped when he signaled her to do so. (Tr. 2/22/10, p.37, L.1 - p.38, L.1.) Notably,
the district court did not use the terms "fled" or "flight" in its Order denying Ms. Round's
motion to suppress (R., pp.148-152), evidencing an implied finding that there was no
evidence of flight. The facts show that Ms. Round merely drove away unaware that the
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unmarked police car that had pulled into the same parking lot was an unmarked police
car. The State's suggestion that Ms. Round's purported "flight" should be considered as
an objective fact supporting Ms. Round's seizure should be disregarded by this Court.
Furthermore, the State asserts that Ms. Round did not affirmatively decline
Detective Christensen's request to search her car. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) This is
simply belied by the record. While Detective Christensen initial ducked the prosecutor's
direct questions about whether Ms. Round declined his request to search her vehicle by
answering that Ms. Round told him she wanted to speak with her attorney (Tr. 2/22/10,
p.40, L.13 - p.41, L. 7), on cross-examination he admitted that Ms. Round actually did
affirmatively decline his initial request to search her vehicle (Tr. 2/22/10, p.56, Ls.1025.) Furthermore, the district court specifically found that Ms. Round "initially refused"
Detective Christensen's request to search her vehicle. (R., p.148.) Although it is not
entirely clear why the State would claim that it did not dispute the district court's findings
of fact, then make an assertion inconsistent with the fact found by the district court and
supported by the testimony of Officer Christensen, to the extent that the State argues
that a failure to outright refuse a search should be considered a factor weighing in favor
of a continued detention, such an argument should be rejected. Government officials
do not have carte blanche to seize or search an individual's person, houses, papers,
and effects unless and until that individual affirmatively protests.
Finally, the State argues, consistently with the conclusions of law reached by the
district court, that Detective Christensen never expanded the scope of his investigation
by seizing Ms. Round while awaiting the arrival of the drug dog, because it was "a
narcotics investigation from its inception that involved the seizure of a person observed
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leaving the scene of the crime." (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) Like the district court, the
State appears to assume that Fourth Amendment protections are limited by the State's
ability to characterize multiple investigations as falling within the same general category
and, therefore, being a part of one larger investigation requiring no individualized
suspicion or probable cause to justify each intrusion into each individual's Fourth
Amendment rights.

Taking this proposition to its logical conclusion, Detective

Christensen's continued detention of Ms. Round was lawful because his objectively
reasonable desire to determine her connection to the Explorer under investigation, and
his mere hunch that she had drugs in her own car, were both "crime related." This is
simply an incorrect interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.

See generally Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981 ); Florida v. Royer,

460 U.S. 491 (1983); State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560 (Ct. App. 2005); State v.
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357 (Ct. App. 2000)); State v. Oanney, _Idaho_, _ , 2012

Opinion No. 34 (Mar. 1, 2012). Once Detective Christensen discovered that Ms. Round
had no connection to the Explorer other than dropping off someone who did, he had
nothing more than an admitted hunch that she had drugs in her vehicle and detained
her until the drug dog arrived.

This continued seizure violated Ms. Round's Fourth

Amendment rights and the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Round respectfully requests that this Court her conviction, vacate the district
court's order of judgment and commitment, and reverse the order which denied her
motion to suppress.
DATED this 2ih day of July, 2012.
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